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Prisoners of War as 
Library Users 
Jean Langdon-Ford 
0 ne does not usually associate libraries and study classes with 
amenities provided for internees in 
Prisoner of War camps in the First World 
War. It was surprising then for me, as 
Librarian/ Archivist of the Canadian War 
Museum, to find evidence in our 
Library I Archives of well-organized 
libraries in the First World War 
internment camps in Germany. My introduction 
to POW library users in this war came about as 
I was undertaking a preliminary inventory of the 
rich resources of the Canadian War Museum 
(CWM) Archives. In the CWM Archives are two 
files related to libraries in POW camps in 
Germany. One file (Accession 19800077) holds 
letters from 2nd Lieutenant Archibald Campbell, 
a Canadian, sent to his parents from his POW 
camp in Germany. The other file (Accession 
19710056) contains information on officially 
sanctioned libraries in German POW camps. 
These discoveries provoked the initial 
interest and prompted me to see as an 
experiment what else could be found to flesh out 
this theme amongst the resources contained in 
the CWM's archives and library. The results were 
sufficiently interesting, not only for 
demonstrating the potential of our archives/ 
library but in elucidating this hitherto neglected 
theme in First World War history, as to merit 
being brought to the attention of the readership 
of this journal. 
Little reference was found in the published 
literature to the establishment of libraries and 
study classes on either side of the conflict during 
the Great War. More information seems available 
on the situation in German POW Camps than in 
their British and Canadian counterparts, and 
indeed few details have come to light on the 
organization of libraries in allied POW 
camps, although it is known that some 
existed. 
According to Jean Laflamme in his 
book, Les Camps de Detention au 
Quebec durant la premiere guerre 
mondiale, German and Austrian 
internees in Canadian camps were 
allowed "quelques journaux ou magazines 
canadiens et americains," but that hardly 
constituted a functioning library. 1 Old Fort Henry, 
holding mainly civilian internees, did have 
educational classes and a library, but it seems 
to have been the exception rather than the rule. 2 
In fact the combined monotony and confinement 
in Canadian camps was acknowledged to have 
contributed to the mental breakdown of certain 
intemees.3 
The serious mental effects of boredom in 
confined quarters were of concern in the 19th 
century to British sea captains exploring the 
Arctic. They began to equip their ships with 
libraries and established evening study classes 
below decks. 4 For related reasons, around the 
same time, the British Army began to establish 
libraries for its soldiers. "The large network of 
libraries, recreational centres, soldiers' homes 
and the like which sprang up in barracks during 
the latter part of the century through military 
and private initiative had as one of its goals the 
prevention of venereal disease in the army."5 
Probably the Victorian notion that idleness 
could make work for the devil was still a current 
idea when the Great War began. With the 
inevitable Prisoner of War camps being 
established in Germany, certain British civilians 
began to take responsibility for the mental as 
well as the physical well-being of their 
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countrymen and allies who were interned in 
German camps. 
The relief effort to provide the POWs with 
the necessary amenities (their needs as 
ascertained by neutral camp inspectors and 
legitimized by the Hague Convention) began 
almost immediately after hostilities broke out 
in August 1914.6 As a consequence, small 
informal libraries grew inside Prisoner of War 
Camps once the system for sending parcels using 
the International Red Cross was developed. 
Eventually, due to the intervention of the British 
Censor (Defence of the Realm Regulation 24B), 
only holders of special permits could forward 
books, magazines and other printed material. A 
Circular to Postmasters from the Canadian Post 
Office Department dated November 1917 
specifies that the British Defence of the Realm 
regulations must be followed for printed material 
sent from Canada to Prisoners of War interned 
abroad. 7 For works of fiction and other light 
literature, the special permit holder was the 
London-based clearing house on Horseferry 
Road called "The Camps Library." Requests from 
POWs for fiction were to be addressed to this 
agency.8 
The Camps Library 
E stablished by book donations from the so-called "Camps Library" foundation in 
Britain, individual Camp Libraries in POW 
Left: POW 2nd Lieutenant Archibald Campbell at 
Karlsruhe Internment Camp, Germany. Here he 
borrowed a mathematics book from the library to 
help occupy his spare time. (CWM Archives) 
Above: Karlsruhe Internment Camp, Germany. This 
is the scene depicted on a post card sent home from 
the camp by Campbell. On the back he had 
written:"Cherio, my new home." The camp was 
comprised of 10 huts, of which Hut 8 was the library 
and recreational centre. (CWM Archives) 
camps began to be well organized with 
catalogued collections and regular arrivals of new 
books. As stated in 1918 in the POW newsletter, 
The British Prisoner of War: the Monthly Journal 
of the Central Prisoners of War Committee of 
the British Red Cross and Order of St. John: 
The aim and ideal of the Library is not only to 
supply to these unfortunate men a means of 
recreation and amusement, and to try and cheer 
a little their hours of imprisonment, but also to 
try and inculcate or gradually cultivate in many 
of them a love for good literature, and a taste for 
wider and more general reading, which may be 
of pleasure or benefit to them in after life ... And 
when sending to Canadians, Australians, and 
others from remote parts of the Empire, always 
when possible we include certain books which 
deal with their own homeland or are written by 
their own countrymen and which we believe they 
are specially glad to get. 9 
Major Peter Anderson, a Canadian officer 
who was confined in the Bischofswerda Camp 
in Germany before escaping from it, wrote that 
"a good many hundred books and magazines" 
were in his Camp Library in 1915. 10 Desmond 
Morton mentions a library in the POW camp at 
Gottingen, a University town, where many of the 
Canadians who fought at Ypres were sent. 11 A 
Report of Visits to English Prisoner-of-War 
Camps in Germany of December 1915 states 
that the POWs' library in Gottingen was 
comprised of 7,000 books in severallanguages. 12 
However, from much of Desmond Morton's 
research it appears the ordinary soldier would 
93 
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not have had the time or energy left to read books 
after working under severe conditions. 13 Yet, a 
system of "wandering libraries" existed in 
connection with the working camps. 14 How much 
libraries were used as nourishment for the mind 
by the underfed prisoner labourers cannot be 
ascertained. Perhaps the idea of physical escape 
from the camps was more immediate than 
mental escape into literature. 
Indeed use of the Libraries seems more 
prevalent amongst the officers, who did have time 
to read. An example is 2nd Lieutenant Archie 
(Archibald Bruce Duchesnay) Campbell whose 
letters home are stored in the CWM Archives. 15 
Campbell worked at the Bank of Montreal in 
Alberta before he joined the Royal Flying Corps 
in May, 191 7. A year of service eventually brought 
him to France, to fly with No. 20 Squadron RAF. 
By September 1918, Campbell was a Prisoner 
of War in Germany, having been shot down 
behind enemy lines. 
In Karlsruhe Camp, Germany, Campbell was 
a limited library user. As an officer, he was not 
required to spend hours on back-breaking tasks 
in mines or on other difficult working camp 
projects. Perhaps out of boredom, or perhaps 
out of desire to keep up his banking skills, this 
particular POW found his way to the Camp 
Library. "So you see we have an awful lot of time 
to spare. I found an elementary arithmetic in 
the library & since then have been solving easy 
problems."16 In Campbell's first letter home (he 
had earlier been reported missing in action), he 
asks "Dad please find out that ifi return to B of 
M (likely I will) what salary, position, etc. I will 
have."17 Campbell was thinking ahead to post-
war life and possibly used the POW camp library 
to help sustain his mental activity during his 
period of captivity. A photograph taken of 
Karlsruhe library about the time that Campbell 
was using its facilities shows shelves of 
catalogued books, several study tables, easy 
chairs and a notice board. 18 
Organizing the libraries inside some camps 
was a labour of love for those interested. The 
British Prisoner qf War journal referred to above, 
which was distributed to Canadian POWs by the 
Canadian Red Cross Society, documents some 
of librarians' trials. From Clausthal, a bleak 
camp in Germany, Lieutenant Alec MacDonald, 
RAF wrote in 1918 to his parents: 
94 
I have spent five complete days ... overhauling the 
library. It had got into a terrible state ... So were-
called all the books and had a room-to-room 
search turning books out, and then added all 
the new books we had been given and sorted 
them all out into categories - Novels - Poetry-
Biographies - History- etc., etc .... We entirely re-
numbered and re-catalogued them all. 19 
AtRuhleben, a catalogue of more than 2,000 
volumes was issued as early as 1915 and sold 
for one mark. This library was run by former 
chartered accountants and they covered the 
library expenses by issuing fines for overdue 
books!20 
Study classes of more than recreational 
reading material were also organized for 
prisoners and this initiative came from the 
second form oflibrary organization available in 
the camps. This library organization was known 
by the awkward title of "The British Prisoner of 
War Book Scheme (Educational). "21 
British Prisoners of War Book 
Scheme (Educational) 
'l"his sophisticated library and study system 
~ supplied books and study material to most 
of the POW camps where British and 
Commonwealth POW officers and other ranks 
were held. From an office in the Victoria and 
Albert Museum, the British Prisoners of War 
Book Scheme (Educational) was directed under 
the auspices of a Committee that included Sir 
Alfred T. Davies of the London-based Board of 
Education, Alice, Countess of Bective, a Major 
David Davies, M.P., Oxford Professor Gilbert 
Murray, and the Librarian of the London Library, 
C.T. Hagberg Wright. The object of the Scheme 
was "To provide British Prisoners of War interned 
in enemy or neutral countries with books for 
purposes of study." Furthermore "Men who 
pursue a regular course of study, either in class 
or privately, are recommended to apply for, fill 
in and obtain authentication of a "Form of 
Record" of their studies, as this may be of use to 
them afterwards. "22 
The following list shows the number of 
camps in different countries which the program 
reached: 
3
Langdon-Ford: POWs as Library Users
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 1997
BRITISH 
PRJSONERS 
OF WAR 
BOOK 
SCHEME 
(EDUCATIONAL) 
Founder and 
Hon. Director : 
SIR ALFRED T. 
DAVIES, K.B.E., C. B. 
VICTORIA 
& ALBERT 
MUSEUM, 
S. KENSINGTON, 
LONDON, 
S.W.7. 
Register No, 
THIS BOOK; suppHed.th~ough 
the agency of the .Scheme, is 
the property, BY Pl.JRCHASE OR 
EXCHANGE, of the undermen-
tioned British Prisoner of War. 
This or any other volume,· if of 
sufficient value to be worth re-
turning and still in a serviceable 
condition, may be ultimately 
returned to the Office of the 
Book Scheme, should the owner 
be willing, so as to be made 
available for otblers (Returned 
Prisoners, Wounded Soldiers 
and Sailors, etc.) who may need 
such books later. 
Please leave thi~ Bookplate intact. · 
Germany- 142 (and others); Austria-Hungary-
12; Bulgaria - 1; Holland - 8; Turkey - 20; 
Switzerland- 9 (and others)23 
Although Campbell's camp, Karlsruhe, is 
listed as having a library under the War Book 
Scheme (Educational), it is referred to as 
temporary camp for officers, and certainly it did 
not appear to achieve the educational status of 
some other camps which had good Reference 
Libraries and study classes in addition to Camp 
Libraries. 24 An example of the latter was 
Ruhleben, a large permanent camp holding 
civilians and military personnel. Here one of its 
prisoners, the renowned Canadian musician, 
Ernest MacMillan, worked on his Doctoral thesis 
in music for Oxford University. Prior to his 
internment, MacMillan had been a music student 
studying in Paris and happened to be visiting 
Bayreuth, Germany when war broke out. 25 At 
least seven other men interned at Ruhleben 
passed the London University Matriculation 
Examination.26 
The type of study and reference books 
needed to achieve this standard of higher 
education were, of course, scarce and expensive. 
The British Prisoner of War Book Scheme 
(Educational), as a charity registered under the 
War Charities Act 1916, made a wide appeal to 
the British public for books and donations of 
funds for purchasing books. This generosity of 
Bookplate for books sent by the British Prisoners of 
War Book Scheme (Educational) to POWs for their 
study use. (CWM Archives) 
spirit to deplete "their own book-shelves in order 
that their treasured (or discarded) volumes may 
minister to the wants of their more needy 
brethren"27 resulted in the amassing of a large 
collection of books to be prepared by volunteers 
for shipment to POWs in response to their 
requests. The following short list shows the 
scope of the applications for books collected by 
the Committee to send to the camps: Art; 
Archaeology; Architecture; Agriculture; 
Commerce and Finance; Chemistry and Physics; 
Geography; Geology; History; Military History; 
Natural History; Law; Literature; Logic; 
Philosophy; Theology; Mathematics; Medicine 
and Surgery; Music; Navigation; Politics and 
Sociology; Trade. 
As stated by the Committee of the British 
Prisoners of War Book Scheme (Educational): 
Any Prisoner who is now studying, or proposing 
to study, during captivity with a view to 
presenting himself for examination by any of 
these Examining or Professional Bodies, and any 
Prisoner who is, or proposes to become, a 
member of these Universities, can be supplied 
with a Syllabus of Examination of any of the 
bodies with whom he hopes to have relations, 
and if satisfied as to his capacity to reach the 
required standards can enter into direct 
communication with them.28 
A much abbreviated list of the Departments, 
Examining Bodies, and Universities includes: 
Imperial College of Science and Technology; 
Royal Society of Art; Royal Institution of British 
Architects; Royal College of Music; The Institute 
of Chartered Accountants; Society of Engineers; 
The Inns of Court; Oxford University; Cambridge 
University; London University. 
Official recognition of the War Book Scheme 
was given by the British War Office, Home Office 
and Colonial Office. Since the scheme also helped 
Colonial prisoners of war, recognition was also 
granted by the Canadian, New Zealand, 
Australian and Indian Governments. 29 
The Scheme's statistics for 191 7 show the 
astounding scope of it activity in the camps. A 
total of 9,650 requests for books were received 
95 
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from prisoners, and 55,570 educational books 
sent out to 200 camps.30 By July 1918, according 
to the Notes of the Month, in the British Prisoner 
of War journal, there was a huge increase in 
demand for technical and educational books by 
POWs in camps in Germany. The increased need 
for this type of material was attributed to the 
fact that: 
the prisoners so largely consist of New Army 
men. Many of these are young professional men, 
budding doctors, engineers, lawyers, seamen 
officers, dentists, and they ask for the newest 
technical books on their various subjects in order 
not to waste the time of their captivity. Such 
books are very expensive and none but the latest 
editions are of much useY 
Eventually, 149 Canadian officers (including 
2nd Lieutenant Campbell) and 2, 767 other ranks 
were freed from the camps following the 
Armistice of 11 November 1918. It would be 
impossible to know directly the effect of the 
benefit of the Camp Libraries and the War Book 
Scheme. Most histories of the First World War 
do not mention the role of libraries in German 
POW camps, but the fact that they even existed 
has to reveal a desire by the prisoners for more 
than food, clothing and shelter. It also shows 
the conviction of many British and Canadian 
volunteers and ordinary citizens that their 
imprisoned countrymen should be given the 
books and study materials to combat boredom 
and prepare for postwar life. 
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C. Anthony Law (1916-1996) 
Official War Artist 
Laura Brandon 
Commander Anthony Law, DSC, RCN, who died on 15 October 1996 in Halifax, was 
one of Canada's most notable naval Official War 
Artists of the Second World War. He was unique 
in that he was a serving naval officer throughout 
the conflict and in the period after the war. He 
retired in 1966. During his long and 
distinguished career as a naval officer he was 
also a professional artist. 
As a young man in the early war years, he 
served on a number of Motor Torpedo Boats in 
the English Channel, and was involved in the 
action against the German battlecruisers 
Scharnhorst and Gneisenau in 1942. In this 
period he still found time to paint, usually when 
ashore during refits. In 1943, for example, he 
received a temporary assignment which enabled 
him to record some of Canada's more notable 
vessels including HMC ships Haida, Chaudiere, 
Huron, and Restigouche. Within the art collection 
of the Canadian War Museum are also to be found 
some exuberant sketches of his shipmates, the 
vessels he served on, and the ports he visited 
during this period. 
The 1943 assignment most likely came about 
through the intervention of Vincent Massey, then 
the Canadian High Commissioner in Great 
Britain, and one of the most energetic proponents 
of a war art programme. As early as 1942 he 
was writing about Law's art to the Director of 
the National Gallery of Canada, H.O. McCurry: 
"Although the real scheme for Canadian war 
artists is still to be organised there are, as you 
know, two or three people painting activities 
among our services here ... There is a young officer 
named Law, who was an art student before the 
war, who has produced some very striking 
canvases in the few hours he gets away from his 
motor torpedo boat in the Channel. "1 
Law's response to how he painted the war at 
sea was recorded in an interview he gave to the 
Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph in December 1943. 
When asked how he could recall subjects clearly 
after periods of heavy action, he responded in 
some detail: 
Certain subjects, phases of battle, for instance, 
form unforgettable scenes in one's mind. Such 
as lovely designs of star shells, flak and the 
horrors of war, ships sinking or on fire. 
Highlights of action sometimes cannot be 
forgotten for a long time. I remember a certain 
night when we met a large enemy convoy heavily 
escorted. They put twelve star shells into the sky 
that was looking so beautiful. It was just like the 
24th of May. That was the subject of my painting 
showing our boats in the middle of the night, 
with all the details shown because of the brilliant 
light coming from the star shells. And as the 
battle was progressing, dawn broke east and we 
could see the enemy convoy ships silhouetted 
against the horizon. That was a scene that I can 
still see today in my mind. It was simply 
unforgettable. And it was easy to reproduce it on 
the canvas.2 
The painting described is likely that depicting 
the action against the Scharnhorst and the 
Gneisenau referred to earlier. 
©Canadian Military History, Volume 6, Number l, Spring 1997, pp.97-l00. 97 
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Right: Survivors, Normandy, Off Le 
Havre. 
(Canadian War Museum CN 10310) 
Opposite top: HMCS Chaudiere 
Portsmouth Dockyard. 
(CWM CN 1 0269) 
Opposite bottom: HMCS Restigouche, 
Evening, (On the Tyne). 
(CWM CN 1 0282) 
But the artist's most intensely felt and 
memorable experiences occurred during the last 
year of the war. Seven years before he died, Tony 
Law published an account of the 29th Motor 
Torpedo Boat Flotilla (which he commanded 
from 1944-45) entitled White Plumes Astern. 
The story is one of remarkable camaraderie and 
courage. In the pages of Law's book the 
dangerous realities of coastal warfare are vividly 
described, as are the men who experienced it. 
The writer's great love of the sea and deep 
affection and respect for the men and ships with 
whom and in which he served is evident on every 
page. Their adventures were many and he was 
awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for his 
service during this time. Nevertheless, the abrupt 
and sudden demise of the Flotilla was probably 
the most searing experience of the war for him. 
As he related in his memoirs: 
[Commander Kerr] took me up to his room, 
poured out a stiff gin, and handed it to me 
silently. Senior officers do not ordinarily offer 
drinks to their juniors early in the morning, and 
my heart began to pound in dreadful 
apprehension. Quietly and without 
circumlocution, he gave me the painful tidings. 
At 1630 on 14 February 1945, the 29th Canadian 
Motor Torpedo Boat Flotilla had been destroyed 
by fire in the Ostend harbour. [The 
Commander's] words fell upon me like a 
sentence of death. I found myself breathing hard, 
with every muscle in my body taut, and my throat 
was choked with the horrible hurt. 3 
Twenty-six lives were lost in what is 
considered to have been the greatest disaster in 
the history of Coastal Force. A fire had broken 
out in one vessel which had ignited the gasoline 
and ultimately caused the on-board torpedoes 
to explode. It is likely that Law's appointment 
as an Official War Artist shortly after this tragic 
event was the result of the loss of his ship and 
flotilla. It is also probable that his sense ofloss 
influenced his choice of subject matter and the 
mood of his paintings. Certainly he was soon 
composing pictures that record the 
decommissioning of Canada's corvette fleet. 
Graveyard, Sorel, P.Q. (10266) (see back cover) 
is one such example. A special melancholy 
pervades the picture, enhanced by its dominant 
colours of purple and yellow, which are symbolic 
of Easter and of sacrifice. 
When one reviews the many other paintings 
of similar subjects from this period one is struck 
by the quality of sadness in them, and one is 
hard pressed not to assign some portion of this 
element to the tragic end that preceded their 
composition. While earlier pictures painted 
before the disaster such as Windy Day in the 
British Assault Area (1 0314) (see back cover) 
are filled with joie de vivre and a youthful 
confidence, the later ones featuring Motor 
Torpedo Boats often focus on adversity, tragedy, 
and the fickleness of nature. One, The Gale of 
Hurricane Force on the Normandy Beach 
(10264), details the destruction wrought on 
landing craft and the Mulberry artificial harbour 
by a terrible three-day storm which began on D-
Day plus 13, June 19. Survivors, Normandy, 
off Le Havre (10310) records the rescue 
operation after a sister vessel was blown up. The 
work is characterized by the violent red-gold 
99 
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The Gale of Hurricane Force on the Normandy Beach. 
flames of the burning ship which reflect off the 
water and onto the wounded sailors. In total, 
Law contributed 29 large paintings and 75 oil 
sketches to the official record of Canada's navy 
during the Second World War, a collection now 
housed at the Canadian War Museum. 
A distinguished postwar naval career 
included an appointment as second-in-command 
of the Arctic patrol ship Labrador. 4 The artist's 
retirement featured active volunteer support for 
a number of arts organisations including the Art 
Gallery of Nova Scotia and Saint Mary's 
University Art Gallery. A series of exhibitions of 
his paintings, some in partnership with his artist 
wife, Jane Shaw, rounded out a busy artistic 
career. All this notwithstanding, Tony Law's chief 
legacy is to be found in his paintings that record 
the deeply felt and observed experiences of a life 
fully lived. 
100 
(CWM CN 10264) 
Notes 
1. Vincent Massey to Harry McCurry, 14 August 1942, 
National Gallery of Canada Archives, Correspondence 
with War Artists, 5.42.L, copy in Canadian War Museum 
Artist File, Anthony Law. 
2. Quebec Chronicle-Herald, 11 December 1943, National 
Gallery of Canada Archives, Artist Files, Anthony Law, 
copy on me in Canadian War Museum Artist File, Anthony 
Law. 
3. C. Anthony Law, White Plumes Astern (Halifax: Nimbus 
Publishing Ltd., 1989), p.161. 
4. For more information on HMCS Labrador see Eric M. 
Fernberg. "A Tough Little Boat: The Pogo - HMCS 
Labrador's Hydrographic Survey Launch," Canadian 
Military History, Autumn 1996, pp. 71-76. 
Laura Brandon is the Chief Curator at the 
Canadian War Museum, Ottawa. 
9
Langdon-Ford: POWs as Library Users
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 1997
The Battle of Moyland Wood 
The Regina Rifle Regi:ment, 
16-19 February 1945 
D. Gordon Brown 
I\ lthough I have written accounts about the 
r-ln-Day Landings in Normandy and several 
costly battles from the beaches to Falaise, I have 
always been reluctant to write about the tragic 
events at Mayland Wood in Germany. My 
reluctance sterns from the fact that this operation 
was the most traumatic for me personally and, I 
think, for our Commanding Officer, Lieutenant-
Colonel Allan Gregory, DSO, during the fighting 
in Western Europe. I take no pride in telling this 
story because my own performance in the battle 
was inadequate. Further, I don't wish to offend 
anyone by resurrecting memories that might 
better be forgotten, or to reveal information that 
does not reflect favourably on anyone. However, 
battle conditions place intolerable pressures on 
people, with unpredictable results. A hero today 
can fail tomorrow. A great leader last week can 
suffer from battle exhaustion this week. 
Fortunately. the Regina Rifles still had many 
heroes at Mayland Wood. Unfortunately, most of 
them were either killed or wounded. That's why 
the story must be told. 
he situation that prevailed in mid-February 
of 1945 must be recounted if the story of 
Mayland Wood is to be adequately told and the 
heavy casualties explained. The 3rd Canadian 
Infantry Division had been in combat almost 
continuously since the invasion of Normandy on 
6 June 1944. The casualties in eight months of 
fighting had been horrendous. Regiments lacked 
trained and experienced officers and non-
commissioned officers, and many soldiers had 
no battle experience. However. our greatest 
problem was attitude. It was clear to everyone 
that the war was almost over in Europe. The 
Russian and Allied armies were inside the 
borders of Germany. It was only a matter oftime 
before Victory in Europe would be achieved. Our 
combat officers and men had lost their earlier 
drive and determination, feeling quite naturally 
that it would be folly to lose one's life with the 
war's end in sight. Those of us who had been 
with our units in England and since the invasion 
were near exhaustion. Some had been wounded 
once or twice and had returned to battle 
voluntarily, but they too were sick of the horrors 
of war. The gung-ho spirit of 1944 had been 
replaced with caution and apathy. We didn't want 
to take unnecessary risks or to suffer casualties 
through errors, either on our part or on the part 
of higher command. This malaise affected all 
ranks, at least those on the battlefield and 
vulnerable to injury or death. The static warfare 
in Holland from November to February had 
contributed to our lethargy. When, early in 
February, the orders came for the attack into 
Germany, it was with some relief, but with little 
enthusiasm, that we began the final resolution 
ofthewar. 
The Operation 
B ritish and Canadian Forces were to capture the city of Cleve, just a few miles inside the 
German border and near the Rhine River. We 
were to clear the enemy from the area west of 
the Rhine and strike south to link up with the 
Americans who were pushing up from the south. 
An important goal was to find another bridge 
over the Rhine for access to the northern plains 
of Germany. Despite the flooded fields and roads, 
3rd Canadian Division and a couple of British 
Divisions captured the battered city and struck 
south. The 15th Scottish Division advanced 
down a main road and through the villages of 
Bedburg and Calcar. Then they ran into strong 
resistance from a small forest east of the road. 
This was Mayland Wood. A force of German 
paratroops, fighting as regular infantry, stopped 
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the Scots cold. The 7th Canadian Infantry 
Brigade, like other Canadian units, was 
understrength, cautious and lethargic, but had 
a reputation of being highly successful in the 
heavy going. We were ordered to take over from 
the 15th Scottish and to clear Mayland Wood, 
so that the road south would be opened to 
armoured units pushing south. The Regina Rifles 
would attack the north end of the wood and the 
Canadian Scottish would then capture the south 
end. The Winnipeg Rifles would remain in 
reserve. The Regina Rifle Regiment, like other 
3rd Div units, had suffered very heavy casualties, 
but was fortunate to have former second-in-
command, Lieutenant-Colonel Allan Gregory, in 
command. He had served well in Normandy, been 
promoted to command the Queen's Own 
Camerons of Winnipeg (2nd Division) and had 
been wounded near the Seine River in France. 
He had returned to the Johns in October to 
replace our beloved CO, Foster Matheson. The 
latter had been given a well deserved rest and a 
promotion to full Colonel with the task of 
organizing Canada's Occupation Brigade in 
England. Allan Gregory, or "Greg," as I knew him, 
was a competent and hard working officer who 
took his responsibilities very seriously. We were 
also fortunate that Regimental Sergeant-Major 
Wally Edwards was still with us, along with 
senior NCOs in the Quartermaster jobs. We had 
fine Administration Support from QM Earl 
Rouatt, Paymaster Don McDonald, Transport 
Officer Jim Cameron, and Vassar Hall, Admin. 
Company chief. We had lost three Medical 
Officers over the months. Captain Syd Huckvale 
had been seriously wounded in Caen. Captain 
Harry Dickson was killed near Falaise and 
Captain Griffiths transferred after several 
months of great service. He had been replaced 
by another capable MO, Captain Frank Olacke. 
We were still blessed to have Captain Graham 
Jamieson as our dedicated Padre. What we 
lacked were confident, competent company and 
platoon officers, NCOs, and men. There were 
exceptions of course, and some of the original 
D-Day veterans were still going well, despite 
being out once or twice with wounds. We had 
also benefitted from the return of Majors Bob 
Orr, 2 i/c, and Len McGurran, officer 
commanding Baker Company, from Italy. 
Nonetheless, we had lost hundreds of our best 
officers and men since D-Day and we were not 
very happy about continuing a war which seemed 
all but over. 
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Brigade Headquarters had decided that the 
Johns should take a run at the wily and 
courageous German paratroops at 1330 hours 
on 16 February. Able and Charlie Companies 
advanced with Able in the woods on the left and 
Charlie along the fringe of the forest, on the road 
to the right. Able Company, under Major Art 
Gollnick, was stopped by heavy fire in the trees 
and dug in after some casualties. Major Gordon 
Baird and Charlie Company advanced a couple 
of hundred yards or so along the road with no 
resistance. Surprised at the lack of enemy action, 
Baird decided to send a platoon of men into the 
woods on a reconnaissance. To his chagrin, the 
platoon, commanded by Frank Shaugnessy, 
disappeared completely without shots being 
fired. Shortly, however, the balance of the 
Company was fired upon and Baird, realizing 
that he had been duped by the clever paratroops, 
withdrew his remaining troops to the startline 
and dug in. One of the riflemen from 
Shaugnessy's Platoon escaped that night and told 
how the platoon had been surrounded in the 
trees by German soldiers, who simply ordered 
them to surrender. 
Baker Company, under 2 i/ c Captain Doug 
Howat, was sent forward to enter the wood to 
the right of Able Company and to advance as far 
as possible. The Company came under machine 
gun and rifle fire, suffered several casualties and 
dug in among the many dead 15th Scottish 
soldiers scattered throughout the wood. The 
morale of"A" and "B" Companies sagged badly. 
During the night my good friend Al Gregory called 
me to Battalion Headquarters and told me that 
Dog Company, which I commanded, was to 
attack through Baker Company and drive the 
paratroops out. I had been unaware of the extent 
of the losses suffered by the 15th Scottish, so I 
prepared for the attack and briefed my Platoon 
Commanders, feeling that, with the support of 
Able and Baker Companies, we would be 
successful. I wondered a bit, however, how Dog 
Company was supposed to crush a German force 
which had already stopped units of the 15th 
Scottish and three Companies of the Regina 
Rifles. "Ours is not to wonder why; ours is but 
to do or die." 
We went forward in single file with Lieutenant 
Warren "Buzz" Keating's platoon in the lead. I 
and my runner-batman, Frenchy Paulin, went 
with Buzz's platoon. It was a foggy morning but 
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"Sunrays" sunning- The senior officers of the Regina 
Rifle Regiment eryoy the sun a little over a week 
after the Regiment's traumatic battle in Mayland 
Wood. Gordon Brown writes, "It was not a luxurious 
holiday in the Reichswald, but we were due for a 
change, out of range of German shelling, and we 
could relax in our dug-outs and wear berets in place 
of the uncorrifortable helmets. Someone took a 
picture of Colonel Gregory, standing, second-in-
command Major Bob Orr lying on the ground, Major 
Len McGurran sitting against a tree, and me, of 
course, occupying the only chair in sight." 
we must have been under observation, for we 
were shelled heavily en route. We had a number 
of casualties before we reached the woods. When 
we reached Baker Company's position we came 
under machine gun, rifle grenade and rifle fire. 
Our casualties convinced us to hug the ground 
where we found that we were lying among the 
dead bodies of the Scottish units and some of 
our own Baker Company dead. Crawling to Doug 
Howat's slit trench, I learned that the enemy 
controlled a large open space in the woods and 
simply had everyone pinned down. The problem 
was, of course, that as in all fighting in heavily-
wooded areas, the defender has all the 
advantages. He is dug in and camouflaged, while 
the attacker is vulnerable every time he moves. 
A determined force of 200 defenders, in heavy 
woods, can hold off hundreds of attackers who 
simply cannot see their enemy. Just ask veterans 
of the Vietnam war about this problem. 
Buzz Keating had managed to get his platoon 
dug in and I asked the other two platoons to 
take cover wherever they could. Morale had been 
shattered by the sight of so many dead. I was 
appalled by the situation. I tried to advise Al 
Gregory of our plight but, as often happened, 
our radio (wireless) didn't work very well. I sent 
Frenchy Paulin the mile or so back to Battalion 
Headquarters. The little French-Canadian from 
Temiskaming, Ontario carried a written message 
outlining the situation and asking for direction. 
Readers of this account will be wondering 
why we didn't have any tank support and what 
sort of covering fire and artillery plans were used. 
It's too long a story to tell here, but our tank 
units had been badly battered in Normandy and 
anywhere that the Germans had their powerful 
anti-tank guns. The famed 88 mm anti-aircraft 
and anti-tank weapon had been especially 
devastating. Further, it was practically 
impossible for tanks to operate in a heavily-treed 
area like Mayland Wood. Three tanks had been 
assigned to fire their machine guns and cannons 
into the wood from hulldown positions near 
where we had entered the trees. The tank crews 
could not see the enemy positions and could only 
fire wildly in the general direction of the enemy. 
The trees absorbed most of the lead. 
An artillery fire plan had been used in 
support of D Company's attack but, without 
adequate forward observation, the fire was 
inaccurate and shells often exploded against the 
tops of trees, raining shrapnel down on us more 
often than not. With good observation and 
direction the artillery fire could have been 
devastating to the Germans in the wood. 
However, our Forward Observation Officer could 
not be found. 
As I waited in a shallow slit trench for a 
message from Colonel Gregory, I thought about 
those well trained paratroops who kept 
peppering us with bullets. They were probably 
the best troops we had faced, and they were now 
fighting in defence of their homeland. They were 
not wild-eyed nazis like the SS back in France, 
but brighter and just as dedicated. They had been 
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Irifantry of the Regina Rifles awaiting the signal to attack Mayland Wood. 
selected to block our drive south and in 
particular to control the road. Relatively safe 
from tanks and artillery, they could toy with 
vehicles trying to use the road and they could 
destroy large numbers of infantry attacking 
blindly into the forest. They probably did not 
have more than seven or eight hundred men in 
the entire wood, which extended for several 
hundred yards. We were perhaps confronted by 
about 400 soldiers in the northern half of the 
forest, but they had all the tactical advantages, 
were well dug in and could stop a brigade attack. 
They had proved it by destroying some 15th 
Scottish units. There was a natural killing 
ground in the trees; a large open area of 
triangular shape directly in front of us. They had 
placed machine guns along their two sides of 
the triangle, while we were pinned down among 
the dead on our side. We were being invited out 
into the open where we could go nowhere but 
into hell. How could we deal with the situation, 
I wondered? I devised a plan which I felt might 
work. In the late afternoon I was asked to see Al 
Gregory at Battalion Headquarters. 
I walked several hundred yards and found 
my trusty young jeep driver, Arnold Dahlen, who 
drove me the rest of the way. Greg met me with 
a friendly smile and took me into a separate 
room. He said that he had just received further 
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direction from the Brigadier, and that Dog 
Company should attack without delay. I was very 
upset, of course, and tried to explain the futility 
of frittering away one company after another 
while achieving little or nothing. I sounded the 
Colonel out about my alternative plan. We poured 
over the detailed map of the area for a very long 
time, well into the evening, tugging at our 
mustaches the whole time. 
My plan was to make use of tanks on either 
side of the wood, followed by two companies of 
the Johns on one side and two companies from 
the Winnipeg Rifles on the other side. Under 
cover of darkness we could create panic by 
entering the wood well behind the triangular 
killing ground and perhaps split the paratroop 
force in two. They would have to withdraw or 
face annihilation. The tanks would not be 
vulnerable in the darkness and the sound of their 
motors might frighten the enemy. There were no 
enemy tanks in the area and few, if any, anti-
tank guns. It was a rare opportunity for the 
armour to play an effective role. Our troops 
would feel better too about doing a joint tank-
infantry operation, rather than moving alone 
against an enemy that held all the cards. 
After explaining the plan, I calmly told Greg 
that I would refuse to order the men of Dog 
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Company to attack across that killing ground, 
but that if a better plan were adopted, along the 
lines of my proposal, Dog Company would be 
involved. Greg warned me strongly about 
refusing to carry out the plan that had been 
devised by Brigade HQ. He asked me ifl knew 
that I could be court-martialled for refusing a 
lawful order. I said that I was well aware of that 
possibility, but that I would rather face a court-
martial than order my officers and men into a 
hopeless attack. Greg shook his head and smiled 
grimly. "OK, Gord, you've convinced me that we 
must have a new plan, along with an artillery 
barrage or an aerial bombardment. I don't know 
how the Brigadier will take to the idea, but I'll 
let you know. Wish me luck." 
Back at the Dog and Baker positions we were 
still being hammered by rifle grenades, machine 
gun and rifle fire. Able Company was on a higher 
piece of ground about 70 yards to the left, so I 
called Buck Gollnick on the wireless and asked 
him if his boys could fire down on the Germans. 
He explained that Able Company didn't really 
control all of the high ground and that they could 
not help us. It was not a healthy place, Mayland 
Wood! At about midnight the Company 
Commanders were called to an "0" group 
(meeting) at Battalion HQ. Greg took me into a 
separate room before the meeting began. He told 
me in grave tones that both he and I were in 
serious trouble for taking such strong stands 
against the Brigade plan. Greg had argued 
strongly in favour of a new plan but had only 
been able to work out a compromise, better than 
the old plan, but not what we had hoped for. 
Three Companies of the Rifles would be involved 
in an attack at first light, supported by our own 
flame-throwing Bren gun carriers. We would 
withdraw quietly from our present positions 
throughout the night, in groups of 3 or 4 men, 
in order to conceal our change of plan. Baker 
Company would filter out first, followed by Dog 
and then Able. Under cover of darkness and the 
morning fog we would get into the open fields 
and farms to the right of the road as Charlie had 
done two days earlier. In order to achieve 
surprise no preparatory barrage would be fired, 
although shelling behind the German positions 
would continue. At first light Baker would attack 
into the woods and seize 40 or 50 yards of 
ground. Dog Company would then pass through 
Baker and attack the ridge about 100 yards 
further in. Able Company would enter the wood 
and attack the enemy still covering the killing 
ground, hopefully from behind, of course. There 
would be no tanks involved but our Bren gun 
carriers would provide machine gun and flame 
support. There was to be no deviation from the 
plan and following the attack, Greg and I were 
to meet with the Major-General (Divisional 
Commander) and the Brigadier to straighten out 
our differences. 
Greg asked me to accept the new plan, as a 
compromise, and promised all the support 
possible. The problem, from my point of view, 
was that in attacking down only one side of the 
Wood, we would permit the enemy to concentrate 
on stopping Baker Company's entry into the trees 
and to do the same with the subsequent attacks 
by Dog and Able Companies. If the paratroops 
were forced to look after both flanks and their 
rear, we could put them in an untenable position. 
I also felt that it was wrong to assume that three 
tired, dispirited and understrength Companies 
could dislodge a determined force of well dug-in 
Germans, in a heavily wooded area. We had 
already suffered a lot of dead and wounded and 
lost a platoon taken prisoner; while the Germans 
were fighting on their home ground. I expressed 
these concerns to the Colonel but agreed that 
the plan was much better than the old one. I 
said that I hoped that I would be able to 
accompany him, after the attack, to the meeting 
with the Brigadier and the Divisional 
Commander. 
The Attack 
We withdrew from our positions as planned and, I think, we did not reveal to the enemy 
that we were pulling out. There was quite a heavy 
fog that morning and we made our way along 
the right of the highway for 300 yards or more 
to some farm buildings which were to be our 
startline. Baker Company launched its attack 
as planned and penetrated the woods for about 
40 yards before being stopped. They dug in. The 
enemy reacted quickly as we knew they would 
and, although taken by surprise, they met Dog 
Company with heavy resistance. The two forward 
platoons, under Lieutenant Warren Keating and 
Sergeant Hunt Taylor, charged through "B" 
Company's position and toward the ridge in the 
forest, about one hundred yards into the enemy's 
positions. I went in with our third platoon, 
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planning to stay directly behind the two forward 
platoons and consolidating on the ridge with 
them. However, we lost sight of them in the 
darkness of the woods and veered left toward 
the paratroops covering the killing ground. The 
crafty Germans had sensed what was happening 
and had turned their machine guns around 180 
degrees to fire at us as we came in behind them. 
Our reserve platoon was the least experienced 
of the three, and we came under a hail of bullets 
and grenades. Several of our young soldiers fell, 
some killed, some wounded. The rest of us dived 
to the ground and, under cover of the trees, we 
withdrew almost to B Company's forward slit 
trenches. There was a lot of firing going on and 
chaos reigned supreme. The flame-throwing 
carriers tried to enter the fray but only one 
actually got beyond Baker Company, where the 
rough going caused it to throw a track. Sergeant 
Milton Adolph, in charge of the carrier, jumped 
out and grabbed a German paratrooper who was 
behind a large tree, punched him and took his 
rifle. The poor fellow ran right into me and 
became our first prisoner. 
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Far left: Lieutenant Warren 
"Buzz" Keating, "D" Company, 
Regina Rifles, somewhere near 
Nijmegen, Holland, December 
1944. Keating was awarded the 
Military Cross for his actions 
during the Mayland Wood battle. 
Top right: Lieutenant-ColonelA.S. 
Gregory, DSO, commanding Q[ficer 
of the Regina Rifles. 
Bottom right: Sergeant Hunt 
Taylor, Company Sergeant-Major, 
Regina Rifle Regiment. He was 
awarded the Belgian Croix de 
Guerre at the Leopold Canal and 
received a Commander-in-Chiifs 
Certificate for his role as a platoon 
commander at Mayland Wood. 
I could not determine exactly where our two 
forward platoons had gone. There was a lot of 
noise up on the ridge so my runner and I, along 
with Captain Howat of "B" Company, tried to go 
forward. We were met by grenades and bullets, 
escaping death only by crawling on our 
stomachs. It was pointless. Able Company must 
enter the wood as planned and neutralize the 
enemy on the left or the whole thing might fail. 
We didn't know if Buzz Keating and Hunt Taylor 
and their heroic troops were still alive and we 
could not go forward to find out, so Frenchy 
Paulin and I returned to the farm across the road, 
running the gamut of machine gun fire coming 
down the road from the left. We found Able 
Company unable to get across the startline 
because of the heavy fire coming down the road 
from the left. The paratroops defending along 
the killing ground had decided to stop anyone 
from crossing the highway. 
Knowing Keating and Taylor as I did, I could 
not believe that they had been taken prisoner or 
that they had not reached their objective. I ran 
across the road, diving between two German 
bodies to avoid machine gun fire, and checked 
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with Doug Howat and Baker Company. There 
was still no sign of my missing platoons, but 
things had quietened up at the ridge. Was that a 
good sign or a bad one? I returned across the 
road, found my runner and together we decided 
to go back into the trees and try to find the 
platoons. We dashed across the road once more, 
advanced beyond "B" Company and, under fire, 
dived into a small enemy trench under a tree. A 
shell hit the tree above us and we received a heavy 
blast. I felt some blood trickling down my 
forehead and raised my hand to wipe it off. 
Frenchy Paulin thought that I must be badly hurt 
and jumped out to charge forward himself. I 
grabbed him by the ankle and pulled him back. 
A tiny piece of shrapnel had gone through my 
steel helmet and stopped on my forehead. I was 
able to pick it off, but I was exhausted and badly 
shaken. 
In Normandy we had learned that it was 
unwise to have both the company commanders 
and their 2 i/ c's in action together. If they became 
casualties at the same time, the company would 
be leaderless. The same was true for platoon 
commanders and their sergeants. So a system 
was devised under which either the commander 
or his 2 il c remained out of battle, so that the 
other could come in as a replacement, if 
necessary. When Francis Paulin and I reached 
Battalion HQ I briefed Al Gregory and 
recommended that the officers who had been left 
out of battle from "A," "B" and "D" Companies 
be brought in to relieve their buddies. That would 
mean that Captain Dick Roberts would replace 
me, Major Len McGurran would replace Doug 
Howat in "B," and Captain Bill Jansen would 
replace Major Art Gollnick in "A." Platoon 
Sergeants and Lieutenants would replace their 
counterparts. Charlie Company, under Major 
Gordon Baird, was still in reserve. 
I apologized to a very concerned Colonel 
Gregory and asked my buddy, Dick Roberts, to 
get Buzz and Hunt out as soon as possible, 
assuming that they were still functioning. 
Frenchy and I went to "A" Echelon to rest. The 
next morning, who walked into my quarters but 
"Buzz" Keating. I threw my arms around him. 
His platoon and that of Hunt Taylor had suffered 
heavy casualties but had driven the Germans 
off the ridge and had beaten off the 
counterattacks. The paratroop position had 
weakened when Bill Jansen took "A" Company 
in and neutralized the Germans on the left. Baker 
Company had helped Dick Roberts to get through 
to our two platoons. A clean up process had 
begun. 
The north end of Mayland Wood was in our 
hands, but the south end was still controlled by 
the paratroops. The Canadian Scottish had 
attacked the south end during the night but had 
lost one full company and had not been 
successful. They had suffered very heavily. Al 
Gregory called to tell me that he had decided to 
assume full responsibility for what had 
transpired and that I would not attend the 
meeting with the Divisional Commander. 
Although I had not been looking forward to the 
meeting, I was a little disappointed at not being 
there to support Greg. I felt that we were justified 
in refusing to attack unless a major change could 
be made in the plan, and I was convinced that 
subsequent events had simply reinforced that 
belief. In any case, by not attending, it gave me 
time to do something that I felt obliged to do. I 
managed to get through to the headquarters of 
the 15th Scottish Division by phone. A Staff 
Officer answered and I wasted no time in telling 
him what I thought about them leaving their dead 
on the battlefield so long. He acknowledged that 
something should have been done before then, 
but explained that they had lost so many men 
that they didn't have the resources to get the job 
done. He promised to do as much as he could to 
arrange for burial of the dead soon. 
Conclusion 
T he Regina Rifle book written shortly after the war points out that on 19 February, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Gregory "was called to act 
as Brigade Commander, as the Brigadier was 
leaving." That was, of course, the outcome of 
Greg's meeting with the Divisional and Brigade 
Commanders. We had been vindicated in our 
position that Brigade HQ had underestimated 
the strength of the enemy in Mayland Wood. I 
knew the Brigadier well, having met him first in 
Normandy. I had sat with him on a Court Martial 
case in December 1944. He had served with 
distinction on D-Day and in the Normandy 
campaign, and had commanded the Brigade 
since August. He was, no doubt, tired and like 
our Colonel Matheson, earlier, entitled to a well 
deserved rest after months of tension and strain. 
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Major Bob Orr moved up from second-in-
command to act as battalion commander. 
Colonel Al Gregory, acting as Brigade 
Commander organized an entirely new plan of 
attack to be carried out by the Winnipeg Rifles, 
to capture the area of the wood still occupied by 
the enemy. He arranged a blistering fire plan in 
support of the Winnipegs, including heavy 
artillery, anti-tank guns, tanks and aerial 
bombardment. The Winnipegs, with the loss of 
about 105 killed and wounded, were able to 
dislodge the paratroopers and drive them out. 
Our early Regina Rifle history ( 1946) states that 
the Regina Rifle Scout Platoon, entering Mayland 
Village brought back one prisoner of war who 
claimed that the balance of enemy troops had 
withdrawn on the night of 20-21 February. 
Lieutenant Buzz Keating and I visited the 
scene of our struggle in the north end of the 
woods and found many enemy dead. We also 
confirmed that the enemy had indeed controlled 
the killing ground, i.e., the open area in the trees. 
The machine gun sites and slit trenches had 
clearly been set up to encircle any intruders into 
Mayland Wood. 
I returned to command Dog Company in the 
advance to the Hochwald and Odem. Then Greg 
arranged a nice gift for me - a trip to Arras and 
Cambrai in France to spend a week with an RAF 
Mosquito Fighter Squadron. The squadron was 
based at a former German fighter field near Arras 
and was flying in direct support of the Army, 
doing night bombing and other raids designed 
to aid us in advancing into Germany. I was to 
provide the airmen with information about the 
infantry and the nature of the battle on the 
ground, and to learn of some of the problems 
faced by the pilots. I had a wonderful week and 
flew with one of the hottest pilots in the squadron 
on a fly-over of the Vimy Ridge Memorial, hedge-
hopping in France and an upside down view 
above Brussels. I returned to action east of the 
Rhine where the Johns had just captured the 
German city of Emmerich. 
Mayland Wood had caused the Regina Rifle 
Regiment more than 220 men killed or wounded 
in 3 days, ahead of the one-day number of 211 
at the Ancient Abbey of Ardenne in Normandy. 
The Leopold Canal battle resulted in the highest 
casualties suffered by the Reginas in Western 
Europe, about 300 in siX days. Thus, Mayland 
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Wood holds second place in our experience from 
a casualty point of view, and ahead of D-Day, 
Bretteville-l'Orgueilleuse, Caen, Falaise, The 
Seine, The Channel Ports, Nijmegen, North 
Holland and Germany. Mayland Wood is, of 
course, one of our battle honours. It was a victory 
for the Regina Rifles, but a very expensive one, 
under very trying circumstances. Among those 
receiving awards for bravery were Lieutenant 
Keating, a Military Cross and Sergeant Hunt 
Taylor, a Commander-in-Chiefs certificate. There 
were others who also deserved awards, of course, 
but as with life, war can never be considered 
entirely fair. 
Buzz Keating and Hunt Taylor deserved their 
recognition. Buzz lives in BC and Hunt in 
Ontario. They have enjoyed meeting each other 
again at reunions. For them, the topic of 
conversation sometimes centres on Mayland 
Wood! Ironically, about two months after the 
Mayland Wood affair, as a result of command 
changes at the divisional and brigade level, A1 
Gregory found himself in command of 7th 
Brigade and I was commanding the Reginas in 
the absence of Major Bob Orr, 2 i I c, who was 
away on assignment. We were to fight our last 
battle of the war at Leer in Germany on 29 I 30 
April 1945. Greg was pushing me to get on with 
the attack, but I reminded him about too much 
haste at Mayland Wood and we shook hands on 
that. We had gone through a lot together since 6 
June 1944 and had become fast friends. 
Unfortunately, Allan Gregory died of a brain 
tumour in 1955 at the age of 39. He had married 
after the war and had established himself in a 
law firm in Vancouver. He had returned to Europe 
to visit the battlefields in July 1955. I received a 
card from him from Caen, Normandy and I have 
kept it ever since. 
Gordon Brown landed with the Regina 
Rifles in Normandy on the morning of 
D-Day. On 8 June he was promoted to 
command Dog Company. He remained 
with the regiment for the entire campaign 
in Northwest Europe except for two short 
periods when he was wounded. He 
retired at the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel 
and now lives in Red Deer, AB with his 
wife, Jean. 
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Escape of the German Army 
across the Westerscheldt, 
September 1944 
S.J. de Groot 
T he writing of this article was made possible by Mr. K. Schacht (Steinkirchen), former 
officer of the Bundesmarlne, who gave me the 
unpublished script of Mr. F. Roher. 1 Mr. Roher 
belonged to the Krlegsmarlne and took part in 
operations in the Dutch waters in 1944. He put 
together a captivating document. Some 
additional research had to be done to put it in a 
clear and complete perspective. The fact that a 
specially formed unit of the Krlegsmarlne was 
able, in 15 days, to ferry across the Westerscheldt 
100,000 men, 6,000 vehicles, 6,000 horse-
drawn wagons and 750 pieces of artillery, 
undoubtably lengthened the war and the 
occupation of a large part of the Netherlands. 
The evacuation across the Wester-Scheldt surely 
can be found in literature. The role of the 
Kriegsmarine, however, forms a forgotten 
chapter, even more so because the event was 
overshadowed by the long battle for the mouth 
of the Scheidt. Now, 50 years after the event. 
through examination of the facts gathered by Mr. 
Roher, we will have to admit this was a 
remarkable logistical operation that was 
perfectly executed under the most difficult 
conditions. 
Background 
T he Allied landings in Normandy on D-Day were followed by months of bitter fighting. 
Slowly but surely the German forces were driven 
out of France, and the German 15th Army was 
pushed from the area where it had been stationed 
for the invasion, namely north of the Seine, and 
into Belgium. This army belonged to Army Group 
B (Model). Because the retiring Germans nestled 
themselves stubbornly in the Channel ports and 
could not easily be driven out of them, the 
advancing Allied armies were getting into 
problems with their logistics. At this point in 
the war, and in fact up until the end of November 
when the large port facilities at Antwerp were 
finally opened, the bulk of Allied units and 
supplies were still being landed over the D-Day 
beaches. The few captured Channel ports did 
not have the capacity to take over this function. 
It was essential to get the port of Antwerp into 
operation to ease the logistical situation. On 4 
September, Antwerp, with its harbour 
installations intact, was taken practically without 
a blow. However, until the banks of the Scheidt 
estuary could be cleared, the British Army had 
to be supplied along the road from Bayeux, a 
distance of 375 km. The American Army had 
the famous "Red Ball Express" that brought daily 
7,000 tons of supplies for Bradley's Army. 2 
It is still a point of contention why the British 
and Canadian troops after the fall of Antwerp 
hesitated so long to push northward. Not until 2 
October, nearly a month after the capture of 
Antwerp, did they begin the clearance operations. 
A very important factor, beside the logistic 
problems, was the tenacious resistance given by 
the 15th Army. Their new commander, General 
G. von Zangen, realised that the largest part of 
his army was threatened to be trapped between 
the Scheidt and North Sea on the one side and 
the liberated part of the Netherlands on the other. 
Beside the strategically important object of 
keeping the mouth of the Scheidt closed off as 
long as possible and therefore preventing the use 
of the harbour by the Allies, there was now the 
need to save as many units as possible from the 
danger of the threatening encirclement. Only via 
the Breskens-Vlissingen and Terneuzen-
©Canadian Military History, Volume 6, Number 1, Spring 1997, pp.l09-117. 109 
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The short distance across the Westerscheldt is clearly illustrated in 
this photo takenfrom Breskens looking across to Vlissingen. 
Hansweert crossings of the Scheidt, and from 
there across Walcheren and South Beveland, 
could they reach North Brabant. This made 
defence of the strip of land just north of Antwerp 
near Woensdrecht vitally important. This was the 
only route to the mainland for German troops 
who had been evacuated across the 
Westerscheldt. 3 Von Zangen requested the help 
of the German Navy in the Netherlands to ferry 
his troops across the Westerscheldt. It is at this 
point that Rohrer's account starts. 
Sonderstab Knuth 
I t was on 4 September 1944 that the Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy, 
Vice-Admiral G. Kleikamp, warned the staff of 
Army Group B that Antwerp could only be held 
for another five days. 4 But on the same day as 
this warning British troops took the city. It was 
not clear to the German High Command where 
the 15th Army was; it was presumably pushed 
up against the coast between Nieuwpoort and 
Breskens. On 6 September the Commander-in-
ChiefWest, Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, 
110 
(Photo by Donald I. Grant. NAC PA 142253) 
warned Admiral Kleikamp, to take care of the 
ferrying of the 15th Army across the Scheidt. 
The 1st Sicherungsdivision ofthe Kriegsmarine, 
with headquarters in Utrecht, received the order 
to execute this task with the greatest haste. There 
were no plans ready for an evacuation of about 
120,000 men with all their equipment, vehicles 
and artillery. The day before, the order had been 
given to destroy all harbours, harbour 
installations, locks and canals. This order was 
rescinded and the commander of the 1st 
Sicherungsdivision, KapitanzurSee Knuth, was 
charged with the evacuation operation. 
Knuth had only been the commander for a 
few months. Right away the order was given to 
direct all surface ships via Dordrecht to the 
Scheidt. Part of the River Flotilla (Kapitan zur 
See H. Engel) was already on the Scheidt. 5 Engel 
requisitioned rescue material on a large scale. 
Knuth formed the "Sonderstab Knuth," 
consisting of himself, Kapitdnleutnant der 
Reserve R. W. Peters and Oberleutnant zur See 
der Reserve G. Kramps. He was ready to move 
to the theatre of operations on 6 September at 
2300 hours. Together with his chauffeur he made 
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the 250 kilometre long drive to Middelburg 
during the night. It was a difficult trip through 
dark streets, with many detours because of 
blown up bridges and danger from the air. They 
reached Middelburg 0500 hours the next 
morning. The local commander supplied them 
with an escort and they went ahead to the 
headquarters of General von Zanger in the village 
bunker. The commander of the 15th Army Corps 
had arrived there the night before. The 15th 
Army itself was situated between Zeebrugge, 
Terneuzen and Breskens. The troops would be 
gradually withdrawn with Breskens as the last 
bridgehead. This bridgehead had to be held as 
long as possible in order to deny the Allies access 
to the Scheidt. Von Zanger insisted in principle 
on bringing across as many men as possible. 
Knuth and his staff went to Vlissingen where the 
32nd Minesweeper Flotilla (consisting of 
transformed fishing boats) and the Outpost 
Boatgroup "Windhuk" were to be stationed. In 
THESCHELDT 
ESTUARY 
Roosendaal , 
e Putte 
Vlissingen they formed the staff responsible for 
the evacuation. The staff was soon joined by the 
ships from "Windhuk," the Vp 2004, Vp 2007 
and Vp 2011, and two Artillerietrager of the 1st 
Artillerietrager Flotilla. 6 Shortly, Knuth and his 
staff were joined by the commanding officer of 
the 32nd Flotilla, Korvettenkapitan Jacobi, the 
commander of the Sea Defence Southern 
Netherlands, KapitanzurSee F. Aschmann, and 
the Vlissingen harbour commander, 
Korvettenkapitan der Reserve R. Wurdeman. 
It was evident that in the preceding days, 
more or less chaotic, some scattered units and 
their arms were brought across the Scheidt. This 
had taken place using the ferries Queen 
Wilhelmina and Queen Emma, requisitioned 
Dutch fishing boats and the Kriegfischkutters 
(KFKs) of the 32nd Flotilla. Troops were ferried 
across at two locations, Breskens-Vlissingen and 
Terneuzen-Hansweert. It was estimated that, up 
lll 
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Allied photo-reconnaissance clearly revealed the extent of 
German movements during the month of September. 
Top: Two German vessels race into the harbour at Vlissingen after completing the crossing from Breskens on 
11 September. Numerous other vessels are visible tied up in the main harbour. At this stage there is little bomb 
damage evident in the port. (WLU Air Photo Collection 16413045) 
Above left: A convoy of vessels clears the harbour at Breskens, just visible on the left, 11 September 1944. 
(WLU Air Photo Collection 15913237) 
Above right: The ships making the passage between Breskens and Vlissengen made ideal targets for air 
attack due to the clear weather and their highly visible wakes. (WLU Air Photo Collection 159 I 4239) 
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Above: The outer harbour of Ternuezen filled wit/1 shipping on 13 September. 
(WLU Air Photo Collection 1 7 4 I 4001) 
Below: Towards the end of the evacuation, heavy bomb damage is visible in Breskens, 22 September. In 
spite qf this, Allied air power did little to hinder the German retreat. (WLU Air Photo Collection 192 I 4002) 
113 
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"Scheldt Crossing" by D.A. Colville 
to 7 September, 25,000 men were ferried across. 
This left 100,000 men still on the south side of 
the Scheidt. The operation began with 60 ships 
but this was quickly increased to 75. As well, 
the original Dutch crews were replaced with 
German personnel. There was doubt about the 
full cooperation of the Dutch, and the fact that 
the vessels would be in service around the clock. 7 
Because the situation at the embarkation 
points threatened to get out of hand, Knuth asked 
Kleikamp to take the necessary steps to ferry 
the constant stream of soldiers as effectively as 
possible and transport them to the east. 
Assembly points, road commanders and 
interception units had to be installed. Two 
officers of the 32nd Flotilla's staff were used to 
regulate the boarding, Oberleutnant zur Seeder 
Reserve Lessing in Breskens and an adjutant-
boatsman at Terneuzen. At the opposite shore 
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(Canadian War Museum CN 12205) 
these functions were performed by the Vlissingen 
harbour commander and officers of the 32nd 
Flotilla, and at Hansweert by Korvettenkapitan 
Stein. 
As order was brought to the operation, the 
15th Army started to select essential material 
for the crossing. Also, the motor vehicles were 
repacked so as to make the most efficient use of 
space. A defensive line was created between 
Breskens and Terneuzen (Nieuwvliet, Oostburg, 
Ijzendijke, Boekhoute, Assenede, Sas van Gent, 
Axel). Assembly points and dressing stations 
were arranged. The transportation of the 
wounded, first on ordinary ships, was continued 
on hospital ships. 
Sonderstab Knuth took as their 
headquarters the commando-bunker of the 
Vlissingen Navy Commander. In the meantime, 
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the communication material arrived from 
Utrecht under the command of Kapitanleutnant 
N. Godehart. In addition to providing 
communications between the ships and the staff 
on shore and higher echelons, this unit of the 
1st Sicherungsdivision also took care of the 
battle information (B. Dienst). To lessen the risk 
of air attacks, the communication vehicles were 
set up in Veere. 8 
The work of the staff charged with the 
crossing entailed, however, much more. It was 
essential to bring the units across with all their 
vehicles, so that these units could be on the road 
to the east to escape the threatened closure of 
South Beveland. Much heavy material, namely 
heavy trucks and artillery, were moved by ship 
directly to their temporary end position. 
Preparations had to be made for the installation 
of mines and obstructions near Doel. Besides 
this, they had to regularly sweep for mines at 
the crossing locations. To the south of the Scheidt 
they formed a special group from the 344th 
Infantry Division to make order and keep it. 
Unofficial crossings were stopped. 
The Day-by-Day Story 
7 and 8 September 
The bad weather made the crossing much 
tougher and the organisation of the Sonderstab 
was not yet felt. 
9September 
The need for the larger ferries was quite clear. 
Besides vehicles and other material, these ships 
could take 300 to 400 men across per trip from 
Breskens to Vlissingen. Units of the 36th 
Minesweeper Flotilla also took part in the 
evacuation. Anti-aircraft defences had to be 
improved. The ferries were equipped with 2 em 
anti-aircraft guns (the Queen Wilhelmina with 
four guns and the Queen Emma with two). The 
Artillerietragers travelling with the ferries were 
responsible for their air defences. In principle 
they sailed day and night when there was no 
danger from the air. It was here that the B Dienst 
in Veere played a very important role. This day 
they took across heavy motorized artillery ( 17 
em). This took place on the route Terneuzen-
Hansweert. There were eight to ten KFKs and 
six motorboats of the Rhine flotilla active here, 
also a Siebel jahre (a type oflanding ship vehicle 
transport) and five or six navy lighters (Marine-
Fahrprahme). This route was much longer than 
the Breskens-Vlissingen route, so there were only 
two crossing a night possible (and often only 
one). The inner harbour ofTerneuzen proved to 
be an ideal place for the loading of heavy railway 
artillery (21 em). The fact that this material, once 
loaded, could be shipped directly through the 
South Beveland canal northwards, made this 
loading point very valuable. The improvement 
of order among the troops around Terneuzen was 
charged to the 17th Luftwaffe Field Division. 
10 September 
The weather improved and 5,000 soldiers 
were taken across. The outpost boats could 
transport 300 soldiers or 15 cars a ship, while 
the anti-aircraft guns could be fully used. New 
reinforcements arrived in Vlissingen - namely 
eight KFKs of the 36th Minesweeper Flotilla. 
11 September 
More soldiers than the day before could be 
ferried across. Two Raumboote (fast shallow-
water minesweepers), the R-83 and R-85, took 
part in the operation from this day. The first 
heavy air attacks took place on Breskens. The 
air defences were constantly strengthened, 
supplied from the material of the 15th Army. 
The air attacks caused 120 dead and wounded, 
beside a heavy loss of materials. The place of 
embarkation, Breskens, was out off commission 
for ten hours. But thanks to building materials 
from the destroyed houses in the area, the 
hoardings were not delayed any longer. 
12 September 
At 0400 hours the crossing was again in full 
swing. More and more dug-outs for the men were 
built. In Breskens they took care that the BOO-
metre-long street leading to the boarding place 
was not packed full with vehicles when there 
were no ships to take them aboard. Slowly the 
front line around Breskens and Terneuzen was 
shortening. The largest number of ships - 75 -
was now available for the evacuation. The 2nd 
Artillerietrager Flotilla (KapiUinleutnant von 
115 
24
Canadian Military History, Vol. 6 [1997], Iss. 1, Art. 9
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol6/iss1/9
Haxhausen) joined the ships on the Scheidt. They 
were placed as floating batteries. It was also the 
first time that 10,000 men with their equipment 
were ferried across in a single day. 
On this day it was Terneuzen's turn to be 
bombarded. Because the telephone connection 
was put out of commission, Kapitc'inleutnant der 
Reserve W. Peters received the order to go and 
check. With the R-83 they left the harbour of 
Vlissingen and found that Terneuzen was afire. 
The loading dock in the outer harbour was 
destroyed and three lighters sunk. The much 
more valuable inner harbour was still intact. 
Personal losses were small, but it took 24 hours 
before everything was functional again. The units 
left on the south side of the Scheidt started to 
worry whether they would be able to reach the 
other side and leave South Beveland. The 
possible loss of Woensdrecht was the cause of 
this fear. The ferry Queen Emma received a 
direct hit on the rear deck. The number of air 
attacks on the retiring troops was increasing 
constantly. 
14 September 
The B-Dienst at Veere was successful in the 
interception of messages regarding impending 
air attacks. The early wamings allowed ships to 
leave the harbours. This day more than 10,000 
men were ferried across. A new route came into 
use, Ellewoutsdijk-Hansweert. It was along this 
route that most of the infantry was brought 
across. 
15 September 
While the crossing was in full swing a heavy 
air attack took place on Vlissingen. However, due 
to the earlier precautions, the attack had 
minimal effect. The number of casualties among 
the troops was small. 
16 September 
The dead of the previous day's attack, among 
them the Navy Officer who coordinated the 
technical supplies, Leutnant Ubben, were buried 
without the interference of air attack. More than 
10,000 men were brought across Terneuzen and 
this again got the attention of the Allied air forces, 
but the ferrying carried on. 
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17 September 
This day the dykes of the isle of Walcheren 
were bombed to let in the sea water. Terneuzen 
came under fire by Allied artillery. Preparations 
were made for the laying of a mine barricade 
nearDoel. 
18 September 
Only the 64th Infantry Division was still on 
the south side of the Scheidt. This Division would 
stay behind to hold Breskens as long as possible. 
It was not until October that these units were 
ferried to Walcheren, but by then the Island was 
encircled. At Terneuzen only one demolition 
group stayed behind, all other men were ferried 
to Hansweert. 
The hospital ships with clear Red Cross 
markings did their work without much ado. 
Doctors did their best to save the wounded from 
the fate of prisoners of war. They were 
transported along the Dutch inland waterways 
to Wesel and Emden. There were two hospital 
ships attacked by fighter-bombers, one was sunk 
between Veere and Dordrecht and the other was 
set afire and grounded near Zijpe. 
19 September 
R-83 and R-85 sailed under the protection 
of darkness to Terneuzen to pick up the 
demolition group. Early in the moming they were 
taken aboard under enemy fire and sailed back 
to Vlissingen. Troops continued to be ferried 
across from Breskens to Vlissingen. These 
combat troops displayed good discipline. 
The completion of the mine barricade at Doel 
suffered delay because the rubber closure rings 
of the mines had to be replaced, for there was 
leakage. It took two days for this to occur, after 
which the mines were set. 
20 September 
The crossing of the 15th Army was completed 
and reported to Vice-Admiral Kleikamp. He gave 
the order for Sonderstab Knuth to return to 
Utrecht. 
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21 September 
Knuth and his people began the return trip. 
They made a short stop at the staff of the 15th 
Army in Dordrecht and the lst Artillerietrager 
Flotilla after which they reached Utrecht at 
2315 hours. A small welcome party was held 
and the Sonderstab was eliminated without any 
fanfare. In retrospect, Knuth could look back 
on a very successful operation. Thanks to his 
activity, 100,000 men, 6,000 vehicles, 6,000 
horse-drawn wagons and 750 artillery pieces 
(from 2 em cannon to 21 em railway guns) were 
ferried across to fight again. In total, nine 
divisions were brought across- the 59th, 70th, 
245th, 33lst, 344th, 346th, 7ll th and 712nd 
Infantry Divisions and the 17th Luftwaffe Field 
Division. 
24 September 
The officers who took part in the operation 
were decorated. In recognition for his efforts, 
Knuth received the Ritterkreuz des Eisernen 
Kreuzes. 
Concluding Remarks 
0 n the same day that Sonderstab Knuth completed its task, 21 September, the 
Royal Navy, formed Force "T' at Brugge to ferry 
Allied troops across the Westerscheldt. The long 
awaited closure of South Beveland finally took 
place with the breakthrough of the Canadian 
troops at Woensdrecht on 4 October. This closed 
off the only land escape route. There still 
followed a bitter battle for the Breskens pocket 
and the isles ofWalcheren and South Beveland 
before the channel to Antwerp could be opened 
for shipping. The 15th Army stayed in the 
Netherlands for a few more months and was 
then set in for the defence of the Rhine. In 
December they took positions around Koblenz. 
This could have been avoided if the Allies had 
pushed on to Woensdrecht right away and cut 
off the escape route of the Germans. 
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''Failure is Not Acceptable'' 
The Recollections of a Canadian in 
the French Foreign Legion 
William Mitchell 
I remember that day very well, a cold Tuesday in January 1989, and Pearson International 
Airport was bustling with travellers. I was 
amongst them, an inconspicuous 18-year-old 
middle-class Canadian boarding the plane as if 
it was a frequent occurrence. A seven-day 
vacation in France, that was the plan. I often 
wonder if I had known then what I do now -
would I have boarded that plane? The trip lasted 
five years and it was no vacation, for within 24 
hours of boarding the plane, I had become a 
member of the infamous French Foreign Legion. 
Life would never be the same again. 
Somewhere in Paris, speaking only a few 
words in French, I decided to check into the 
address that I had so innocently found in a 
library book at high school- a recruiting centre 
for the French Foreign Legion. I had not believed 
it existed outside of movies such as March or 
Die or Laurel and Hardy. However, the old fort 
was quite real, the soldier in a 'white hat' who 
slid the peek-slit open was real, and the 
slamming of the huge wooden door behind me 
was certainly real. In a few hours, my belongings 
were confiscated, my passport was taken away 
and I was given a regimental track suit and some 
washing kit. I was not the only one there, people 
from all over the world, including places as far 
away as New Zealand, were being interviewed. 
There were some tests conducted here over the 
next few days, but the real testing would begin 
down in Aubagne- a town just outside Marseilles 
in southern France - where I would spend a 
month with hundreds of other possible recruits. 
I would not start basic training until April when 
those who were accepted were shipped to 
Castelnaudary (south central France between the 
Black mountains and the Pyrenees)- a place I 
would hate for a very long time. My upbringing 
would have to be thrown out, my Canadian 
middle-class perspectives quashed, and my 
ethics stowed for the duration. It would take a 
long time before I could say Castelnaudary 
without shuddering. 
We were divided up into sections roughly the 
same size as a Canadian platoon. In my section 
there were 47 candidates. Over the next four 
months we would be trained in all aspects of 
military life in the Legion. It was not what we 
learned that was particularly difficult, rather it 
was how we learned it that broke many. The 
discipline in the Legion can be described at best 
as being ferocious. Examples are numerous, you 
are starved- yet not to death. Hunger is used to 
teach night topography - as you will only eat 
when you can read and find map coordinates. 
At the 'farm' - a small isolated farmhouse 
somewhere in the Black or Pyrenees mountains 
- the eating room for our meals had only one 
entrance- via a ten-foot rope. 
Fatigue -the Legion taught me the sanctity 
of sleep. It became a precious commodity, which 
at Castelnaudary came second to building seven-
foot rock pyramids at three in the morning, 
singing, and the occasional special event like an 
unexpected full-dress funeral for a cigarette butt 
at dawn. These events were outside of the regular 
day schedule which began at 0400 hours and 
ended - on paper - at 2200 hours. Two weeks 
into instruction, we had our first deserter. 
Violence was continuous - almost a fight 
every day - tension was ever-present and 
personal vendettas were always a diversion from 
the day's activities. Respect was the commodity 
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The author undergoing training at Castelnaudary. At left he climbs the "eavesdrop·· in an exercise designed 
to simulate the irifiltration of a building or fort. At right he takes leaps from the "paratower'' during his 
jump training. 
most sought after by everybody. To be respected 
by other candidates, and the Corporals in charge 
of us, made life so much easier. Two months into 
instruction the physical strain took effect. Some 
were released for physical damage, others for 
mental damage. To watch a man slowly change 
and finally break was something of which I took 
special note. Suicides are common at 
Castelnaudary and if you fail you get 30 days in 
jail. Graduation could not come too soon and 
for many of us, the training would continue at 
the Regiment. 
Snapshots of Operations 
French Guyana- 1989 
~e patrols in the equatorial forest would last 
.1. ten to 20 days; patrolling was an extremely 
laborious job. In a good day, between 0600 hours 
and 1800 hours, we would be able to cover 6-7 
kilometres but normally we would manage only 
3-4 kilometres because of river crossings or map 
inaccuracies. Topography in the equatorial forest 
was also a slow and tedious job if there were to 
be any accuracy at all. Drug runners from 
Surinam were our responsibility. They were 
running cocaine into French Guyana to pay for 
Ronny Brunswick's anti-Communist war. By the 
time the cocaine arrived on the European 
market, it would be cut again and again, and the 
price would jump making it very profitable for 
every kilo that made it through. The average drug 
runner was not the Miami Vice stereotype but 
rather a poor farmer without shoes carrying a 
home-made shotgun. It would be easiest if we 
caught them loading a pirogue- a large hollowed 
tree trunk- because they would not stand their 
ground. However, stumbling onto them in the 
jungle could prove to be quite dangerous. 
Another job in Guyana, which was seen as a 
chance to relax, was guarding the European 
Space Centre. This included the radar, 
communications, and launching equipment. It 
became bothersome, however, when constant 
delays forced us to stay out in the bush more 
than necessary. There was a launch 
approximately every four months, as the rocket 
itself was shipped in sections from France and 
assembled on site. Security was especially tight 
when the rocket was moved from the building 
site to the actual launch pad by rail, and as it 
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The author presents his section. 
sat exposed there for the launch. It was a very 
tense hour or two for many people. 
As it turned out, getting used to the 
equatorial forest itself was very stressful. There 
were many sorts of animals which could be 
dangerous, including neuro-toxic frogs and 
poisonous snakes. However, the most difficult 
aspect of the equatorial forest was the insects. I 
was sure that the whole country of Guyana was 
built on an ant hill. If you sat down on the ground 
for any extended period of time (30 seconds) you 
would most likely be bitten by a variety of ants. 
If you stayed out after sunset, you risked losing 
your nose or ear to a parasite-carrying mosquito. 
A few days on the somewhat tropical Devils' 
Island helped us to relax before heading out into 
the jungle once again. 
The Gulf War - 1990-1991 
I remember being on leave somewhere in Paris when I received the order to return. Despite 
having to cut short my leave, I was still quite 
excited about going, and quickly bought some 
last minute things at Orly airport before 
returning to the south of France. I had no idea 
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then that I would spend almost five months in 
the desert before any action started and when it 
did, in the space of three days, I would come to 
within a three-hour drive of Baghdad before they 
called the cease-fire. The rush I had been in to 
return to southern France would turn into long 
days of waiting under the Saudi sun. 
The long lead up to the actual invasion was 
the toughest. There were continuous rumours 
about what was going to happen when the war 
actually began. We passed the time in Saudi 
Arabia preparing equipment and replacing older 
stocks of gear and ammunition. There were also 
several exercises which were used to determine 
which tactics were best suited for the terrain. 
Differing from the other forces in Saudi Arabia, 
we did not go into town or live within walking 
distance of any civilization. The Legion spent six 
months at various campsites throughout the 
Saudi Desert. 
When the war started with prep bombing and 
shelling, things were very tense amongst the 
allies. We did not trust the Egyptians or the 
Syrians in our zone. (It would not take long for 
us not to trust the Americans either as they 
seemed to be just a little too eager to shoot. 
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Above: Three hours from Bagdad. 
Right: Al-Salamin airport 
Speaking French at night check-points in the 
82nd Airborne zone was a big risk apparently 
they found French and Arabic quite similar.) 
Everyone seemed anxious to fire their artillery, 
rockets, and missiles at the Iraqis. One night on 
the Saudi-Iraqi border, about 13 kilometres from 
an Iraqi outpost, we had just gone to sleep in a 
reconnaissance bivouac, with nobody between 
the Iraqis and us except our forward observation 
post (FOP) fifty metres in front. At about 0300 
hours, a convoy of French trucks and artillery 
encountered our FOP and exchanged the right 
codes and continued to pass between our FOP 
and our bivouac. The legionnaire at the FOP had 
no idea what they were doing but correctly 
followed the set procedure and let them pass. At 
around 0330 hours, I awoke from my sleep in a 
panic as the ground shook and my ears rang- I 
ran for my hole outside my tent thinking we were 
being shelled. To my surprise, just 20 metres 
from my tent was a battery of French 105 mm 
guns blasting away at the Iraqi outpost. After a 
heated yelling match with the artillery officer, they 
very quickly packed up and disappeared. We also 
had to leave quickly because of the danger of a 
counter-battery attack on the cannon flashes 
which could easily be seen from the Iraqi ridge. 
I was not very happy the next morning and briefly 
considered accidentally giving the wrong ID 
codes to the FOPs for the next few nights. 
War came and we raced into Iraq. I was on 
the front of the Al-Salamin airport assault, and 
because of the extremely open terrain, was able 
to see the huge divisional attack develop as we 
waited for the final assault orders. Flights of 
Gazelle helicopters hit bunkers with missiles and 
rockets, two American A-1 Os tore up the heavier 
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armament, and the French artillery ( 105 mm 
cannons and 120 mm mortars) finished off. The 
AMX -10 tanks then rushed the barrier firing at 
specific targets. We could trace the shooting 
accuracy by the shell tracer and would cheer as 
it found its mark. Then it was our turn. We closed 
to within 50 metres of the first bunkers and slit 
trenches, then rushed them under the cover of 
.50 calibre machine gun fire and a hail of 7.62 
and 5.56 mm bullets. That day was 
unforgettable. The depths of the sky were black 
from the Kuwaiti oil rigs set ablaze hundreds of 
kilometres away to the east. It was like a storm 
that continuously threatened, but never arrived. 
The Republic of Central Mrica 
rphere had been riots every day that week, and 
~ there was tension throughout the city. Every 
day we would try and push a convoy through to 
the airport three kilometres away and every time 
we would be forced to turn back. Across the 
street from the Bungui base was a football pitch 
which was being used for a landing and 
unloading zone for Puma helicopters running 
supplies from the airport. There was one day in 
particular which I will remember for a very long 
time, when a Puma had landed to unload 
supplies. A mass of people, mostly young adults, 
had surrounded the helicopter and began 
pummelling the helicopter with rocks and bricks. 
The situation was deteriorating quickly when one 
of our intervention squads was called in. Since 
manpower was simply unavailable, the squad 
had six muzzled and leashed German Shepherds 
which were very effective in crowd control. 
Usually, just the arrival of the dogs was enough 
to break-up a crowd, but this day was different. 
Despite the dogs being unmuzzled, the crowd 
continued to press on the helicopter in the field. 
This was probably due to the youth of many in 
the crowd. Normally Legion security forces were 
far more respected by the local population due 
to the fact that disputes between civilians and 
their government in this country were not 
interfered with. To that day, the Legion had 
refused to support government troops in their 
oppressive tactics- which included the offensive 
use of grenades and bullets - and was more 
content to explain to local leaders that if they 
did not interfere with the operations of the 
Legion, this would continue. However, the 
situation was nearing critical and possible 
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shooting would soon ensue to assure the safety 
of the pilots and the helicopter. In a last attempt 
to avoid opening fire, the dogs were let go. 
Immediately the crowd broke up in a tremendous 
confusion, and the netless frames of the soccer 
goals became covered with dangling bodies trying 
to avoid the huge dogs. 
A perimeter was eventually established and 
the helicopter was unloaded, taking off 
immediately for the airport. As a Legionnaire, 
the politics have long been put aside, and as far 
as I was concerned the minor injuries inflicted 
by the dogs were preferable to spending another 
four months with a population upon which we 
had opened fire. The injured were collected and 
treated by the same supplies which were shipped 
in, the local leaders were convinced of the gravity 
of the situation and further clashes were avoided. 
However in the weeks following, government 
troops clashed with the oppressed population 
many times, killing 37 people and injuring many 
more. 
Kinshasa, Zaire 
I t was not clear which military unit was supporting which politician. What was clear 
was that the French-trained Zairois paras had 
not been paid in over a year, and they had decided 
to collect. In a confusing chain of events, the 
Foreign Legion found itself in charge of Kinshasa 
and the international airport, which was a 
dangerous 27 kilometres outside of the city. In 
another surprising tum of events, I found myself 
assigned to protect two civilians carrying a 
briefcase to the airport for the last plane out. It 
was no ordinary escort, there was just myself 
and one other Legionnaire riding in a tiny civilian 
Peugeot 4L. Literally armed to the teeth, we took 
with us hand grenades, rifle grenades, our 5.56 
FAMASs, and a reserve 9 mm automatic. We then 
set out in the late evening for the four-lane 
parkway to the airport through a fire-lit city gone 
mad. 
It was a highly tense but uneventful trip to 
the airport. At the airport, mass confusion 
reigned as civilians of all nationalities attempted 
to get out of the country. Brandishing our 
weapons we were given a wide berth all the way 
to the plane. ( I knew the airport very well 
because of a very confusing exchange of gunfire 
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with local troops two nights earlier.) I fought hard 
the urge to stop and talk to people wearing or 
carrying Canadian flags. I just wanted to return 
to the section HQ and the security of a complete 
military unit. We started out for the return trip 
to the city. The trip back was not uneventful. 
About 15 kilometres outside of the city. we saw 
what appeared to be a roadblock on our two 
lanes. At that second I made the decision to run 
it. There was absolutely no way that I would even 
let the civilian driver slow down. The night before 
a roadblock had resulted in the death of three 
civilians and a stolen Mercedes, so I warned the 
driver not to stop, and emphasized the point with 
my FAMAS. As we closed to about 500 metres, I 
prepared a AC-59 (Anti-Tank) rifle grenade on 
the end of my FAMAS. Ghram, the Legionnaire 
behind me, loaded a clip of tracer and rolled 
down the side window. The tension was extreme 
and I worried about the driver. I had no 
plan ... maybe blow a hole through the 
roadblock ... or just get killed quickly ... we 
continued the approach. I soon made out a 
variety of Zarois uniforms around the truck 
which confirmed my decision not to stop. As we 
got closer, I pulled the safety pin off the nose of 
the rifle grenade and prepared to lean out of the 
car. At that moment however, I saw the situation 
more clearly and ordered the driver to slow down 
but not to stop. Apparently a tractor trailer had 
jack-knifed across the two lanes, but there was 
enough space to pass on the outside curb of the 
parkway. I told Ghram to take off his beret and 
keep the guns down- but ready. We approached 
at a slower speed ... time slowed to a stand 
still. .. and then we were thankfully waved through 
by some lightly armed soldiers .. .! guess driving 
a Peugeot 4L rather than a Mercedes has its 
advantages. We passed the scene smoothly and 
breathed a sigh of relief. 
There were some repercussions from the 
incident. The civilian voiced his distraught over 
my orders (and methods of emphasizing them) 
to my very concerned-looking commanding 
officer. However, once the civilian had calmed 
down and left, my CO broke into a laugh and 
slapped me hard on the shoulder. 
In those September days of confusion, some 
2000 people were killed or injured, Kinshasa 
was wrecked, and Seta Moboutu remained in 
power. 
Chad 
I t had been a long patrol. over two weeks long, and most of us were quite sick of being 
bounced around in the back of the lorries on 
the raised dirt roads. We were 30 kilometres out 
from N'Djemena and excited about the prospect 
of mattresses, hot showers, and real food. 
However, it was not to be so simple. During our 
trip, events in N'Djemena had come to a head, 
and the army had split. The Zagawa (a large 
Chadian ethnic group) had taken 40 Toyotas, 
some with fixed 14.5 mm heavy machine guns, 
and made a run for the Southeast. 
Unfortunately, the command centre in the 
capital was unaware of our patrol's return and 
did not inform us of the split, so our lead VLR 
lorry ran into the tail end of the rebel column. 
The following events occurred, pieced together 
after the fact, as I did not see the initial contact. 
As the Legion VLR approached the Toyota pick-
up, which was packed with eight soldiers, one 
of the panicking soldiers in the back decided to 
place the RPG launcher on top of the Toyota cab 
and let go a rocket at our lead VLR. The action 
caused complete carnage - not only did the 
rocket force our VLR into a crashing roll off the 
side of the road - sending people and equipment 
in all directions, but the backwash from the 
launcher ripped apart the shooter's comrades 
behind him in the pick-up. The action ended as 
quickly as it had begun, and for the next three 
hours many of us worked very hard to save lives. 
When the last injured were taken out, we had 
lost a full combat group three dead, the rest 
injured, while the rebels had fared worse; five of 
their own men had been killed by their own 
inexperience and two others severely burnt. Only 
one RPG rocket had been fired incompetently 
-resulting in a very high cost for everyone. Over 
the next week a chase developed, followed by 
negotiations, and a solution. This would settle 
things until the next dry season. 
Coming Home 
M Y return to Aubagne after five years of service was extraordinarily emotional. They 
offered various scenarios for rank and good 
postings making the choice more difficult yet 
123 
32
Canadian Military History, Vol. 6 [1997], Iss. 1, Art. 9
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol6/iss1/9
Scenes from Chad. 
I dreamed of retuming home and being amongst 
friends and family. The memories of people, 
places, and situations so recently experienced 
were etched into my brain forever. There were 
many times when I regretted ever joining, but 
there were also times I wouldn't want to have 
missed. I chose to come home because of one 
main factor- at 23 years of age I believed I could 
chalk the five years up to experience and build 
upon it. If I stayed, I ran the risk of closing in on 
eight years of service, when the pension at 15 
years becomes enticing, and I would consider 
staying in until I was over 30. The pension option 
compared to other pensions sounded good, but 
during my five-year contract I never met a 
Legionnaire who was able to leave the Legion 
cleanly (no permanent mental or physical 
damage) after 15 years. I walked out past the 
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security gates for the last time - as 
indistinguishable as when I first came in- hailed 
a taxi and within three days arrived home in 
Toronto where the whole thing began five years 
earlier. 
Upon leaving the Foreign Legion in 1993, 
William Mitchell enrolled in Political Science 
at Memorial University in Newfoundland. 
He fills his spare time playing on the 
Provincial Rugby team and has won awards 
for his poetry. He has been accepted into 
the MA/PhD International Conflict Analysis 
program at the University of Kent at 
Canterbury in the United Kingdom 
commencing this fall. 
33
Langdon-Ford: POWs as Library Users
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 1997
Review Essay 
''Donkeys'' or ''Lions''? 
Re-examining Great War Stereotypes 
Jonathan F. Vance 
Duff Crerar, Padres in No Man's Land: Canadian Chaplains and the Great War (Montreal: MeGill-Queen's 
University Press, 1995 ). $39.95, 424 pages, ISBN 0-7735-1230-6. 
David French, The Strategy of the Lloyd George Coalition, 1916-1918. (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 
1995), $108.00, 332 pages, ISBN 0-19-820559-7. 
J.P. Harris, Men. Ideas and Tanks: British Military Thought and Armoured Forces. 1903-39 (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press (distributed in Canada by UBC Press), 1995), $34.95 paper, 342 pages, 
ISBN 0-7190-4814-1. 
Jeffrey A. Keshen, Propaganda and Censorship During Canada's Great War (Edmonton: University of 
Alberta Press. 1996), $29.95 paper. 333 pages. ISBN 0-88864-279-2. 
Edward H. Wigney, The C.E.F. Roll of Honour: Members and Former Members qfthe Canadian Expeditionary 
Force who Died as a Result of Service in the Great War, 1914-1919 (Privately published (available 
from Eugene G. Ursual, P.O. Box8096, Ottawa, Ontario, KlG 3H6), 1996), $135.00, 867 pages, ISBN 
0-9698857-3-3. 
W hen the Theatre Workshop's production of "Oh! What a Lovely War" opened in London 
in 1963, it came in the middle of a wave of revived 
interest in the First World War. As much about 
the 1960s as it was about 1914-1918, the 
production made another splash in 1969 when 
it was transformed into an equally arresting film 
by Richard Attenborough. In short order, the film 
became the most visual aspect of what Alex 
Danchev has nicely characterized as the 
'"bunking' and debunking" of the First World 
War. 1 
"Oh! What a Lovely War" fleshed out the icons 
which, since the late 1950s, had adorned 
popularized histories of the war. Among the most 
memorable characters of the film were John 
Mills as Sir Douglas Haig, a plodding dullard 
with the imagination of a turnip, and Laurence 
Olivier as Sir John French, garrulous and a tad 
randy. At the other end ofthe spectrum were the 
"lions," to use the metaphor adopted by Alan 
Clark (from a probably apocryphal remark 
attributed to Falkenhayn) as the basis for his 
1961 best-seller The Donkeys: the much-tried 
and much-misused infantrymen who deserved 
better than to be driven to their deaths by 
moronic generals. 
To these stereotypes we might add a few 
more, created by generations of poets, novelists, 
and historians since the 1920s. There is the 
yammering and jingoistic propagandist viciously 
lampooned by Siegfried Sassoon in poems like 
"The Effect," "Editorial Impressions," and "Fight 
to a Finish. "2 There is the chaplain, also a 
favourite target of Sassoon (the Bishop of 
Byegumb in his poem "Vicarious Christ" is 
another brutal caricature), who exhorted men 
into the furnace but was careful not to stray to 
close to the fire himself. And finally there were 
the politicians, the "old men of Europe," who, 
like Nero, fiddled as their world burned. 
By the 1970s, these were the central figures 
in the conventional wisdom regarding the First 
World War. It was a war in which witless generals 
(the "donkeys") threw their troops against barbed 
wire and machine guns like lambs to the 
slaughter, for the simple reason that bUnkered 
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tactical thinking and limited imagination 
prevented them from pursuing any other course. 
These "brass hats" fought the enemy in front of 
them, but also the enemy behind, the "frock 
coats" who spent their days bickering over how 
to prosecute the war. The victims of their almost 
criminal insanity (the "lions") fought gamely but 
inevitably came to despise the generals and 
politicians for their callousness, and to discard 
their idealism, which seemed completely 
irrelevant amongst the supreme futility and 
pointlessness of the Western Front. Equally 
loathed by the troops were the bibulous 
churchmen who supposedly ministered to souls 
but whose energies were really directed towards 
ensuring that the soldiers were refrained from 
drinking, gambling, womanizing, and the other 
simple pleasures that were open to them. And 
on the home front, dishonestjoumalists and fat 
propagandists ensured that the "stay-at-homes" 
continued to believe that the war was a gallant 
affair of redcoats and happy warriors. 
Sketched in such exaggerated terms, these 
characters approach the ridiculous. 
Nevertheless, they have had remarkable staying 
power. Fed by such classics as Paul Fussell's The 
Great War and Modern Memory ( 1975 ), the 
conventional wisdom, with its requisite doses 
of pathos and tragedy, has provided ample fodder 
for popularizers, documentary producers, and 
countless undergraduate history and literature 
courses. Not until the late 1980s did it come 
under any serious challenge and even then the 
lions I donkeys theme, and all of the related 
stereotypes, stubbomly refused to be unseated. 
Fussell now draws strong criticism for a cavalier 
disregard of facts, but the caricatures he helped 
create retain their appeal. 
Debunking the debunkers, to use Danchev's 
terms, has become something of a growth 
industry, and Crerar, French, Harris, and Keshen 
all offer further attempts at revising decades-old 
caricatures. David French's book amounts to a 
re-examination of the legendary disputes 
between generals and politicians, which he 
dismisses as postwar finger-pointing engaged in 
by men who were desperately trying to shift 
blame for tactical disasters onto someone else. 
Instead, he argues persuasively that the frock 
coats and brass hats were in fact united in the 
view that, for Britain, winning the peace was as 
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important as winning the war. In this reading, 
the Battle ofPasschendaele becomes an entirely 
logical operation, in a strategic if not a tactical 
sense: in the context of the time, with the collapse 
of Russia, the possible collapse of France, the 
success of Germany's submarine offensive, and 
the slowness of the American build up, there was 
no other option for British policy-makers than 
to launch a major offensive in Flanders. 
French then asks us to reconsider wartime 
rhetoric about British war aims that stressed 
the need to stem the threat of German aggression 
and ensure the security of the British Empire. 
Derided by later observers as an attempt to divert 
attention from the fact that the war's causes lay 
in tawdry economics, French insists that those 
aims were right and just and, despite the 
immense human and economic cost of the war 
to Britain, were largely realized. Britain, 
concludes French, emerged from the war with 
immeasurably greater international prestige, 
even if the British were unable to recognize it. 
As he puts it, "the willingness of British policy-
makers to sacrifice almost three-quarters of a 
million men to defeat the Central Powers made 
a profound impression on the minds of its former 
enemies" (296), an impression that persisted 
until it was destroyed by the appeasers. 
J.P. Harris, too, is rather kinder to British 
policy-makers than some recent historians. He 
declines to view the generals as being "blind to 
the opportunities afforded by such new 
technologies" as the tank (315), arguing instead 
that most army commanders were more than 
willing to consider the tank on its own merits 
when the idea was first presented to them. Even 
Haig, usually stereotyped as a general who 
refused to allow any new ideas to enter his mind 
after 1904, was "as positive as could reasonably 
have been expected given their limited combat 
power" (315). In short, Harris puts J.F.C. Fuller 
in his place, reminding us to treat warily anything 
Fuller said that was later proven correct by the 
experience of the Second World War. In the 
context of 1916, the tank was a poor solution to 
the tactical problems posed by the stalemate on 
the Western Front. The wonder is not that GHQ 
failed to express more faith in the weapon, but 
that they gave it any consideration at all. Just as 
the battle of the memoirs was a postwar attempt 
at scapegoating, so too was the idolatry of Fuller 
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and the tank in the interwar period: if only Haig 
had given the tank a chance, so much slaughter 
could have been avoided. 
Duff Crerar takes on an equally well 
entrenched stereotype, the well meaning but 
widely despised (at least by the troops) padre, 
although this attempt at revisionism is less 
successful. It is largely an administrative history, 
focusing on the struggle to create an efficient and 
effective chaplain service that was free of 
favouritism and denominational jealousies. In 
this regard it is an excellent study, and an 
admirable record of John Almond's tireless 
efforts to bring order to the chaos into which 
the chaplain service had degenerated under the 
tender ministrations of Sam Hughes and his 
cronies. Crerar is less convincing when 
discussing the impact of chaplains on the 
soldiers. He dismisses the traditional view, that 
soldier had little respect for chaplains because 
few of them were willing to share their dangers 
and discomforts, but introduces little fresh 
evidence for any contrary view. He also has 
relatively little to say about the message conveyed 
by chaplains to their charges and does not 
venture into an examination of the religion of 
the trenches, a curious blend of salvationist 
fundamentalism and superstition. He does, 
however, present a convincing variation of an 
argument made by other historians: postwar 
disillusionment among ex-chaplains did not grow 
out of the horrors they had witnessed on the 
battlefields, but out of their frustration with a 
peacetime society that seemed to betray the 
ideals for which the fallen had died. Also worth 
mentioning is the book's excessive referencing. 
Fully 140 pages of notes for 231 pages of text is 
completely uncalled for, and should have been 
ruthlessly pruned by an editor. 
In light of this prevailing revisionism, it is 
perhaps ironic that the portrait of Ernest J. 
Chambers, Canada's chief censor, in Keshen's 
book is in itself stereotypical. He is shown in 
the uniform of Gentleman Usher of the Black 
Rod, and appears every bit as true-to-type as if 
he had been rendered by Sassoon: pompous, 
self-important, humourless, and severe, this 
Chambers would have been a perfect subject for 
Sassoon's acerbic pen. And yet, as Keshen makes 
clear, Chambers was quite different than this 
one-dimensional caricature. He may well have 
been over-zealous, particularly when 
suppressing the ethnic press, but he was also 
diligent (often making himself available at any 
hour of the night or day), selfless (he declined a 
salary for his work, insisting that the honorarium 
he received as Gentleman Usher was sufficient 
for his needs), and tactful (preferring to use 
personal diplomacy rather than edicts to achieve 
the desired goals). Whatever long-term 
consequences Chambers' work may have had for 
ethnic minorities and for the schism between 
veterans and stay-at-homes, in the short term 
he was successful in ensuring that Canadians 
remained committed to the ideals and goals of 
the cause. On another level, Keshen also has 
some interesting things to say about the publicity 
campaigns created for recruiting and fund-
raising purposes. He provides valuable evidence 
for an argument which has long been inferred, 
that the ultimate failure of volunteerism in 
Canada was as much a failure of marketing and 
public relations as anything: if the recruitment 
campaigns had been managed as capably as the 
Victory Loan drives, conscription might not have 
been necessary. 
With all of the old stereotypes coming under 
reconsideration, one is left to wonder if there 
are any foundations left upon which to build a 
new conventional wisdom. In a curious way, the 
soundest base is provided by the names which 
fill over 800 pages ofWigney's book. In what can 
only be described as a labour of love, he has 
sifted through the records of the Commonwealth 
War Graves Commission and the Department of 
Militia and Defence, Canada's Book of 
Remembrance, and countless regimental 
histories and memorial volumes to compile a 
register ofthe 67,000 men and women who died 
in uniform from the beginning of the war to the 
final demobilization of the Canadian 
Expeditionary Force in 1921. The entries are 
necessarily brief, confining themselves to name 
(including aliases), rank, number, unit, date of 
death, place of burial, and any remarks that 
could be included in the space available, but they 
are sufficient to make the book an invaluable 
reference tool. The Roll of Honour also calls into 
the reader's mind endless questions about the 
thousands of lives cut short. Was Private Deligny 
Lambert of the 22nd Battalion celebrating the 
Armistice when he died of wood alcohol 
poisoning on 17 November 1918? What drove 
Corporal Watson Jamieson of the 7th Canadian 
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Railway Troops to slit his own throat on 21 
January 1918 near Poperinghe? And what of 
Private Herbert Jones of the 26th Battalion, who 
was only sixteen years old when he went missing 
in action on the first day of the Battle of Vimy 
Ridge? What experiences had he packed into 
those few years of life? 
In compiling this record, Wigney is in fact 
responding to an impulse felt by Canadians who 
lived through the First World War. The Armistice 
was followed in this country by an unprecedented 
wave of memorialization as communities, 
business, churches, and schools felt impelled to 
record the names of their fallen in stone or 
bronze. They believed fervently that the names 
had to be preserved for posterity because, once 
the names were forgotten, the ideals for which 
lives were lost would disappear as well. They 
may well have been right. The ideals for which 
the First World War was fought (not to mention 
the mentalities with which it was fought) seem, 
to many people in the 1990s, strange and 
incomprehensible. It is easy to descend into 
hand-wringing and tut-tutting, and to fasten 
blame for the horrors of the Western Front on a 
few broadly drawn caricatures. It is much.more 
difficult to make the psychic leap back to 1914-
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and structure of Canada's military, a look bock 
at the men and women who helped to build 
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1918 and see things with contemporary eyes: 
how bizarre an idea the tank must have seemed, 
how the strategic situation of 1917 made an 
attack at Passchendaele seem sensible, or how 
passionately people were moved by God, King, 
and Empire. 
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